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    <title>Japan on CrossGov.com</title>
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    <description>Recent content in Japan on CrossGov.com</description>
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      <title>Section 232 Becomes the Main US Tariff Tool: Metals at 50%, Autos, Chips, Drones and Polysilicon Next</title>
      <link>https://crossgov.com/section-232-becomes-the-main-us-tariff-tool-metals-at-50-autos-chips-drones-and-polysilicon-next/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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      <description>&lt;p&gt;Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 lets the Commerce Department investigate whether imports threaten national security and lets the President set tariffs if they do. Since the Supreme Court struck down the emergency tariffs in February 2026, it has become the administration&amp;rsquo;s main tariff tool. It now covers steel, aluminium, copper, cars, trucks, lumber, some semiconductors, patented drugs and drones, with polysilicon due in December.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;The law suits the purpose. It needs no vote in Congress, has no time limit and sets no ceiling on rates. The courts have mostly deferred to the executive on what counts as national security.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Semiconductor Export Controls Fragment: Nvidia H200 Licences Stall, Nexperia Splits and China Targets Japan</title>
      <link>https://crossgov.com/semiconductor-export-controls-fragment-nvidia-h200-licences-stall-nexperia-splits-and-china-targets-japan/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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      <description>&lt;p&gt;On 28 September 2026 China&amp;rsquo;s Commerce Ministry confirmed what Washington had announced a few days earlier: the US–China trade truce is extended by two months, to 10 January 2027. With it goes the pause on a US rule that would have extended chip export controls to companies majority-owned by listed Chinese firms.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Two months is the new unit of semiconductor policy. Rules are issued, suspended, licensed, frozen and extended on short timers, and each government runs its own clock. For a chip company, the problem in 2026 is four or five moving regimes that don&amp;rsquo;t line up.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>US-Japan Critical Minerals Pact Moves Toward Price Floors as China Squeezes Japan&#39;s Rare Earth Supply</title>
      <link>https://crossgov.com/us-japan-critical-minerals-pact-moves-toward-price-floors-as-china-squeezes-japans-rare-earth-supply/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 15 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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      <description>&lt;p&gt;In March 2026, at a summit in Washington, US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer announced a US–Japan action plan on critical minerals. It&amp;rsquo;s meant to be the basis for a binding agreement among several countries, with minimum prices for minerals enforced at the border, coordinated stockpiles and joint financing for mining and processing projects. The same summit added a memorandum on deep-sea rare earths near Japan&amp;rsquo;s Minamitorishima island and a second tranche of Japanese investment, up to $73 billion, including 13 critical mineral supply chain projects.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Chip Subsidies Compared: US Takes an Intel Stake, EU Drafts Chips Act 2.0, Japan Funds Rapidus and Korea Legislates</title>
      <link>https://crossgov.com/chip-subsidies-compared-us-takes-an-intel-stake-eu-drafts-chips-act-2.0-japan-funds-rapidus-and-korea-legislates/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 10 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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      <description>&lt;p&gt;In August 2025 the US government became one of Intel&amp;rsquo;s largest shareholders. It took 9.9% of the company, 433.3 million shares at $20.47 each, for $8.9 billion. The money wasn&amp;rsquo;t new. It was $5.7 billion of CHIPS Act grants Intel hadn&amp;rsquo;t yet received, plus $3.2 billion from a defence programme for secure chips, converted from grants into equity.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Four years after the big chip subsidy laws, the four main manufacturing democracies outside Taiwan are spending in very different ways. Washington is turning grants into deals. Brussels is rewriting its law after admitting the target was out of reach. Tokyo is pouring money into one national champion. Seoul has moved from subsidies to legislation and funds.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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